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We document that analysts cater to short-term investors by issuing optimistic target prices. 
Catering dominates among analysts at brokers without an investment banking arm as they face 
lower reputational cost. The market does not see through the analyst catering activity and their 
forecasts lead to temporary stock overpricing that short-term institutional investors exploit to 
offload their holdings to retail traders. We also report evidence consistent with catering brokers 
being rewarded with more future trades channelled through them. Our study identifies a new source 
of conflicts of interest in analyst research originating from the ownership composition of a stock.   
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1. Introduction 
Extensive literature documents that analysts behave strategically and issue optimistic forecasts to generate 
corporate business and commission fees for their brokers or please the firm’s management (e.g., Dugar 
and Nathan, 1995; McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Lin and McNichols, 1998; Hong and Kubik, 2003; 
Jackson, 2005). An important result in this literature is that institutional investors curb optimism in analyst 
forecasts as they reward brokers producing less biased research with their trades (Frankel et al., 2006; 
Ljungqvist et al., 2007). The underlying idea is that institutional investors prefer informative and unbiased 
research because they use sell-side analysts’ research as an input into their valuation models and 
investment strategies (Ljungqvist et al., 2007; Cheng et al., 2006; Brown et al., 2014). However, previous 
research ignores likely heterogeneity in preferences for unbiased research among institutional investors 
stemming from differences in holding periods. Specifically, short-term institutional investors, such as 
hedge funds, may favour optimistically biased research that facilitates profitable trades. Analysts may be 
willing to issue biased forecasts to cater to short-term investors because this group generates the bulk of 
trade commissions (Goldstein et al., 2009; Hintz and Tang, 2003). The market may fail to see through 
biased forecasts in which case optimistic forecasts will lead to temporary increases in stock valuations that 
benefit short-term investors when they sell their holdings. This study sets out to test this catering 
hypothesis.  
We expect that, to please short-term investors, analysts will issue optimistic target prices or 
increase bias in their target prices (TPs). We focus on target prices for stocks held by short-term investors 
because (1) TPs provide a direct investment recommendation compared to analyst earnings forecasts, 
which are inputs into valuation models, (2) stock recommendations derive from TPs (Bradshaw, 2002), 
hence any bias in stock recommendations should largely reflect optimism in analyst target prices, (3) TPs 
are more granular than stock recommendations making them more suitable to channel analyst optimism1, 
                                                          
1 Analysts cannot increase optimism in their stock recommendations if the outstanding recommendations are already 
at the top of the rating scale. Stock recommendation changes are constrained after 2002 because most brokers moved 
to a three-tier recommendation system and they had to disclose the distribution of their outstanding recommendations 
in each analyst report, which increases the cost of issuing optimistic recommendations (Kadan et al. 2009).  
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and (4) the reputational cost for biasing TPs is lower than for issuing optimistic EPS forecasts or stock 
recommendations because target prices do not factor into analyst and broker rankings such as those 
compiled by the Institutional Investor, The Wall Street Journal and StarMine (Brown et al., 2015).  
To examine the proposition that analysts cater to short-term investors, we divide the analysis into 
two parts. In the first part, we establish that ownership by short-term institutional investors affects TP 
optimism. In the second part of the study, we examine short-term price reactions to analyst TP 
announcements. The latter tests suggest that the market does not see through the analyst catering activity 
and their forecasts lead to temporary stock overpricing that short-term institutional investors exploit to 
offload their holdings to retail traders. We use two measures of ownership by short-term investors: the 
average holding period for a representative investor in a stock from Gaspar et al. (2005, 2013), and the 
percentage ownership by hedge funds, which are on average short-term investors (Cella et al., 2013). 
Empirical tests confirm an economically significant relation between TP optimism and the institutional 
investor holding period—a one standard deviation reduction in the average institutional investor holding 
period associates with an increase in TP optimism by 65.7% compared to the average level. Importantly, 
we show that TP optimism increases only after analysts observe a significant increase in short-term 
ownership in a stock, consistent with analysts reacting to changes in the stock’s ownership composition 
rather than investors reacting to optimistic TPs. We also conduct other tests to mitigate the impact of 
reverse causality inferences. Using hedge fund holdings as an alternative way of capturing ownership by 
short-term investors produces virtually identical conclusions. Together, the results confirm that analysts 
distort their TPs in the presence of short-term institutional investors.  
Further tests reveal that it is analysts at brokers without an investment banking arm that advises on 
capital market transactions (IB) who are more likely to issue optimistic TPs. This evidence reflects that 
trade commissions are more important for non-IB brokers as IB brokers can diversify their revenue 
sources away from trade commissions (Rhee, 2010; Cowen et al. 2006). It is also consistent with the 
marginal cost of reputational loss from issuing biased forecasts being higher for IB brokers as accurate 
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and informative research helps win investment banking transactions (Ljungqvist et al., 2006).2 Together, 
the evidence suggests that a specific analyst group—analysts with lower reputational costs—is more likely 
to cater to short-term investors.  
A challenge to establishing the causality of the effect we document is addressing endogeneity 
concerns. We address endogeneity in three ways. We believe these three tests help alleviate the concern 
that our results reflect cases where short-term investors select firms with more biased TPs in the hope of 
exploiting potential stock misvaluation. First, we use instrumental variable regressions to mitigate the 
distortion arising from the endogenous choice of stocks investors hold. Second, we use regression 
specifications with firm- and analyst-fixed effects to control for the impact fixed omitted correlated 
variables have on the results. Third, we use a quasi-natural experiment related to the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy and explore in our tests the resulting exogenous variation in the use of reputable brokers.3 
Collectively, these results partially mitigate the concern about the impact of omitted variables or 
confounding effects. Further, we show that our results are robust to sensitivity tests, which include (1) 
using alternative measures of TP bias, (2) looking at changes in TP bias relative to changes in ownership 
composition, (3) addressing alternative explanations, and (4) employing different model specifications. 
We also document that catering happens on the short-side as analysts issue more pessimistic TPs for 
stocks with high short interest.   
In the second part of the study, we first examine short-term price reactions to analyst TP 
announcements. Consistent with our prediction, we find that investors fail to see through analyst 
incentives to bias TPs for stocks with high short-term ownership. The short-term price reaction results 
                                                          
2 To further support the conjecture that IB analysts face higher reputational costs for issuing biased forecasts, which 
discourages catering to short-term investors, we also examine analyst Institutional Investor All-America Research 
Team rankings. All-America (Star) analysts are more likely to be employed by investment banks because their 
presence has a bearing on the choice of the investment advisor in security offerings (Hong and Kubik, 2003; Hong et 
al., 2000; Ljungqvist et al., 2006; Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Dunbar, 2000). We find that Star analysts are less 
likely to bias TPs; any catering to short-term investors comes primarily from non-Star analysts. 
3 The collapse of Lehman Brothers not only reduced the pool of brokers through which investors can channel trades, 
but also put into question survival of many other brokerage houses. Because of the uncertainty about whether some 
brokers would survive to execute future trades, many investors switched to the safety of large reputable brokers. 
Thus, the uncertainty created by Lehman Brothers’ collapse generated exogenous variation in the choice of brokers 
with investors normally choosing less reputable brokers opting for other investment banks (Mackintosh, 2008).  
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confirm that biased TPs lead to temporary increases in stock valuations, which could be interpreted as 
analysts creating “windows of opportunities” for short-term investors to sell their holdings. 
Correspondingly, we document that short-term institutional investors take advantage of these “windows of 
opportunities” and sell their holdings to retail investors. Specifically, we show that higher TP bias reduces 
(1) future percentage short-term institutional holdings and (2) the number of future short-term institutional 
investors in a stock. Long-term investors do not trade on optimistic TPs, which leads to an overall 
reduction in institutional ownership and a corresponding increase in retail investor ownership. Together, 
our evidence confirms that biased TPs facilitate more profitable trades by short-term investors at the 
expense of retail investors.4 Our results are consistent with Brown et al. (2015, 38), who document that 
retail investors are the least important client group to brokerages and conclude that “most analysts focus 
on addressing the needs of large, institutional investors, rather than the needs of small, individual 
investors”. Our story assumes that the catering broker will receive some commission, either from sales of 
holdings by short-term investors or the subsequent reinvestment of the sale proceeds. Our final test shows 
that short-term investors increase their holdings in other stocks covered by the broker that engages in 
catering and we can expect that at least some of their trades will be channelled through the catering 
broker. This result, jointly with the evidence that analysts cater to short-term investors, is consistent with 
the prediction that short-term investors reward catering brokers with their trades.5  
This study is of interest to academics, regulators and market participants. First, it adds new 
evidence to the literature on conflicts of interest in analyst research (Dugar and Nathan, 1995; McNichols 
and O’Brien, 1997; Lin and McNichols, 1998; Hong and Kubik, 2003; Firth et al., 2013; Gu et al., 2013). 
We identify a new source of conflicts of interest arising from the ownership composition of the stock. Our 
                                                          
4 Our results do not depend on analysts privately communicating their actions to short-term investors, i.e., “tipping”, 
which most brokers proscribe (Irvine et al., 2007). Rather, public disclosure of the target price is necessary to create 
“windows of opportunities” for short-term investors to off-load their holdings. We assume short-term investors have 
the sophistication to recognize that analyst TPs are overly optimistic, for example, through comparison with their 
own valuations. This assumption is consistent with past studies which document that institutional investors, and 
short-term investors such as hedge funds in particular, are sophisticated investors (e.g, Malmendier and 
Shanthikumar 2007, 2014; Cella et al., 2013). Further, short-term institutional investors can easily access analyst 
target prices through analyst reports and morning notes as well as Bloomberg or Thomson Reuters terminals.  
5 Because data on how investors allocate trades across brokers is not available, our test provides indirect evidence of 
short-term investors rewarding catering brokers. 
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results qualify the conclusion in previous literature (e.g., Frankel et al., 2006 and Ljungqvist et al., 2007) 
that institutional investors curb analyst propensity to issue biased research. Rather, our findings suggest 
that non IB-affiliated analysts cater to the needs of short-term institutional investors, such as hedge funds, 
and issue biased forecasts that facilitate profitable trades by these investors at the expense of retail 
investors. Our results are in-line with the warning issued by Laura Unger, former acting chairman of the 
SEC, in a testimony before a congressional subcommittee that analysts face pressure from their 
institutional clients to produce biased research (Unger, 2001). We confirmed our results with informal 
analyst interviews, who accept the practice is quite common. We recommend that future research that 
examines properties of analyst forecasts, such as accuracy, bias and price impact, controls for the stock’s 
ownership composition to ensure validity of tests.  
Second, our study adds to the literature on the interactions between analysts and short-term 
investors such as hedge funds. Klein et al. (2014) and Swen (2014) show that hedge funds trade prior to 
analyst recommendation changes, which suggests that analysts disclose their private information to hedge 
funds so that hedge funds can buy the stock at a lower price. Our paper complements these studies as we 
focus on how analysts, through their optimistic forecasts, facilitate hedge fund exits from stocks they own.  
Third, our results are important for regulators as they add to the concerns of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) that certain market mechanisms create incentives for abusive market 
practices. Section 28(e) of the Securities and Exchange Act permits bundling of trade execution and 
research service costs. However, our results suggest that such bundling creates incentives for analysts 
unaffiliated with investment banks to issue research benefiting a small group of institutional investors at a 
disadvantage to retail investors. Our findings are topical given the recent argument by Juergens and 
Lindsey (2009) that, following regulation Fair Disclosure and the Global Research Analyst Settlement, 
brokers might have stronger incentives to extract revenue from trade commissions.  
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2. Research design 
2.1 Measures of short-term institutional investment 
In this study, we use two measures to capture holdings by short-term investors. First, following the extant 
literature (Gaspar et al., 2005, 2013), we calculate the institutional investor investment horizons using the 
Churn Ratio measure 
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where CRi,q is the churn ratio of investor i in quarter q,  Nk,i,q is the number of shares in firm k, held by 
investor i in quarter q; Pk,q is the stock price of firm k in quarter q; Δ denotes the quarterly change 
operator; Qq is the number of firms in investor’s i portfolio in quarter q. The idea behind the CR measure 
is that we can classify an investor as short term if she churns her overall portfolio frequently. Inversely, 
we can classify an investor as long term if she holds her stock positions unchanged for a considerable 
period. 
Using the CR measure, we then estimate Investor Turnover at the firm level as 
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which is defined as the weighted average of the time-averaged portfolio of churn rates of all the investors 
who have shares in firm k in quarter q. In other words, Inv_TR captures the average holding period of a 
representative investor. Equation (2) allows us to use the churn ratios for each institutional investor with 
positive shareholdings in a firm in order to characterize firms based on their average institutional 
shareholder profile as firms where the representative investor has long (low Inv_TR) or short (high 
Inv_TR) holding period.  
The second measure of holdings by short-term investors is the percentage ownership by hedge 
funds, %HF ownership. The hedge fund industry has grown rapidly over the past decade, from less than 
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$500 billion in assets under management in 2000 to over $2,500 billion in 2014, becoming the most 
prominent group of short-term investors (Financial Conduct Authority, 2014; Ben-David et al., 2012). 
Using Equation (1), Cella et al. (2013) show that hedge funds have among the highest churn ratios 
compared to other investor groups (twice that of pension funds), consistent with their short holding 
periods.  
 
2.2 Measures of target price bias 
In terms of our main dependent variable, we follow prior studies that examine bias in analyst earnings 
forecasts and target prices (Bradshaw et al., 2013, 2014; Bilinski et al., 2013; Bonini et al., 2010) and 
measure TP bias, TP biasa,k,d, as the signed difference between the target price issued by analyst a for firm 
k on day d and the actual stock price at the end of the 12-month forecast horizon, Pk,12, scaled by the stock 
price two days before the TP issue date Pk,d-2,  
, , ,12
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, 2
.
a k d k
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P −
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=      (3) 
Positive values of TP bias indicate optimistic target prices. In calculating TP bias, we use the 12-
month-ahead stock price to match the forecast horizon of the target price. This approach is similar to the 
standard way of measuring EPS accuracy where the forecast is benchmarked against the actual EPS 
revealed at earnings announcements. A significant advantage of the TP bias measure is that it captures 
instances where a select group or all analysts engage in catering. Both settings are important because 
catering can happen even if all analysts issue optimistic forecasts (e.g., because short-term investors would 
penalize brokers who do not engage in catering by withdrawing their trades). In sensitivity tests, we 
recalculate the TP bias measure (TP bias 2) based on a 6-month forecast horizon to adjust for revision in 
analyst target prices (Bradshaw et al., 2014).  
We complement the TP bias and TP bias 2 analyses with a measure of TP optimism based on the 
intuition that optimistic target prices will rarely be met by the actual share price over the forecast horizon. 
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Correspondingly, as in Bradshaw et al. (2014), we define an indicator variable for whether the maximum 
stock price over the next six months is smaller than TP, and zero otherwise, 
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Following Bradshaw et al. (2014), in measuring TP_not_met, we choose a six-month horizon to control 
for revisions in analyst TPs, but our conclusions are similar when using a 12-month horizon. 
The TP bias measures described so far capture ex-post accuracy similar to EPS forecasts accuracy 
measures used in past studies (e.g. Stickel, 1992; Sinha et al., 1997). For robustness, we also consider 
three ex-ante measures of TP optimism. First, following Bradshaw et al. (2013, 2014) we calculate the 
ratio of the target price to the share price around the forecast issue, i.e., the analyst’s forecasted capital 
gain on the stock, TP/P adj. As in Bradshaw et al. (2014), we then adjust the forecasted ex-dividend return 
for the return on the S&P500 index because higher TP/P values could simply reflect higher expected 
return on the market 
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Higher values of TP/P in Equation (5) indicate more optimistic forecasts. This measure is not influenced 
by investor trades following the forecast announcement and is easily observable by investors at TP 
forecast issue. A limitation of TP/P adj as a target price optimism measure is that high forecasted return 
can capture better firm prospects rather than analyst optimism.  
 The second ex-ante TP optimism measure is calculated as the consensus adjusted target price:  
( ), , , , , , ( 32, 2) , 2a k d a k d consensus k d k dTPrelative TP TP P− − −= −      (6) 
 where , , ( 32, 2)consensus k dTP − −  is the median TP for stock k measured over 30 days prior to the TP issue date. 
TP relative captures relative TP optimism compared to the outstanding TP consensus. A limitation of the 
relative TP optimism measure is that it has low power to identify catering in instances where a large 
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number of analysts engage in this activity.  
 The final ex-ante TP optimism measure is the percentage revision in analyst a consecutive TPs for 
firm k: 
, , , ,
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where TP biasa,k,d-i, is the preceding target price issued i days before the current TP. We require that TPs 
used to calculate revisions are no more than 300 days apart. More optimistic target prices should associate 
with stronger positive revisions. However, similar to TP/P adj, positive revisions can also capture better 
firm prospects. We acknowledge there is no single “ideal” TP optimism measure, which is why we use 
multiple measures to build confidence in our conclusions.  
 
2.3 The regression model 
We use a regression model to examine the association between bias in analyst TPs and shareholdings by 
short-term investors. Our main model specification is the following:  
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To avoid simultaneity, TP bias is for the next quarter compared to the quarter where we measure short-
term holdings. In additional tests, we also use the other measures of TP optimism described in the 
previous section as dependent variables in Equation (8). The variable of interest is Short_term_holdings, 
which is either the measure of investor turnover or hedge fund ownership calculated in the quarter 
preceding the TP issue quarter. The coefficients on Inv_TR and %HF ownership should be positive if 
analysts bias their TPs to cater to the needs of short-term investors. We control for the level of institutional 
ownership in a firm, IO. We expect a negative relation between percentage institutional ownership, IO, 
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and TP bias consistent with the evidence in Frankel et al. (2006) and Ljungqvist et al. (2007) that 
institutional ownership moderates bias in analyst forecasts.6    
We expect that optimistic TPs create a “window of opportunity” temporarily inflating valuations 
of stocks held by short-term investors. The “window of opportunity” exists even if most analysts issue 
optimistic TPs, however, we expect variation in catering activities across analysts due to heterogeneity in 
catering costs. Ljungqvist et al. (2006) document that firms are more likely to reward investment banks 
with advisory mandates if their analysts produce unbiased research. As a consequence, catering is more 
costly for analysts at brokers with an investment banking arm that competes for advisory mandates. 
Inv_bank captures whether the analyst is working at a broker with an investment banking arm (IB). We 
expect analysts at non IB brokers to be more likely to engage in distortion in their TPs in the presence of 
short-term investors as they face lower catering costs.  
We use a number of analyst (A) and firm (F) characteristics to capture other predictors of TP bias. 
Analyst characteristics include analyst firm-specific forecasting experience (Ana_experience), which 
measures forecasting skill and knowledge an analyst has gained over time (Clement, 1999). We calculate 
the number of firms (Ana_firm_followed) an analyst follows as Clement (1999) suggests that it is more 
onerous and complex to actively follow and produce research reports for a large number of companies. 
We expect more experienced analysts and analysts who follow fewer firms to issue less optimistic TPs. 
Firm characteristics include firm market capitalization (MV) and the number of analysts following 
a firm (Firm_following), which proxy, respectively, for the visibility of the stock in the market and the 
competition among analysts. We expect analysts to produce less biased forecasts for more prominent 
stocks and when the competition among analysts is high. B/M is the book-to-market ratio and MOM is the 
price momentum. Analysts are likely to be more optimistic about firms with higher growth options and 
firms that experienced recent price run-ups. We use stock price volatility scaled by the mean price level to 
measure firm total risk (Cov). We expect higher TP bias for more risky stocks. To control for time and 
                                                          
6 Inv_TR and IO capture distinct concepts: IO captures the level of institutional holdings whereas Inv_TR the average 
holding period of a representative investor in a stock, thus the former variable does not subsume the latter as both 
capture different economic constructs. The correlation between IO and Inv_TR is only 0.037. 
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industry effects, we include industry dummies (Industry dummies) based on the Fama and French industry 
definitions and a set of annual dummies (Year dummies) for the TP issue year. Investor turnover and the 
level of institutional ownership in a firm are measured one quarter before the TP issue quarter. Analyst 
characteristics are measured at the TP issue date. Firm characteristics, other than analyst following, are 
measured at the end of the previous fiscal year y. Firm_following is measured at the TP issue date. We use 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm and analyst level (Petersen, 2009). Table 1 
provides detailed variable definitions. All continuous dependent and explanatory variables are winsorized 
at the 1% level. 
Insert Table 1 around here 
 
3. Data 
We collect target prices from I/B/E/S Detail files from January 1999 to March 2011.7 To calculate the TP 
bias measure, we select only target prices with a 12-month forecast horizon and for firms where the actual 
stock price is non-missing 12 months after the forecast issue date. Analyst and broker characteristics are 
constructed using both I/B/E/S TP and EPS Detail files starting from January 1995, which avoids 
eliminating observations in the early sample period when constructing our explanatory variables and 
produces more reliable measures (Clement, 1999). Daily stock price data and the number of shares 
outstanding, used to calculate firm market capitalization, are from CRSP. Accounting information is from 
the CRSP/Compustat merged database.  
Information on quarterly institutional holdings is from Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings 
(13F) database. Thomson-Reuters collects information contained in Form 13F proxy statement filed with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). All institutional investors with $100m or more in assets 
under management are required to file the 13F form with the SEC.  
Hedge fund information comes from the CISDM database, which includes information on 6,000 
                                                          
7 The other commonly used source of target price data, First Call, was acquired by Thomson Reuters in June 2001 
and was subsequently merged with I/B/E/S. First Call target price data was discontinued in 2004.  
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active and 13,000 inactive hedge funds, providing one of the most comprehensive datasets on US hedge 
funds that is survivorship bias free. CISDM is commonly used in the hedge fund literature (e.g., Bollen 
and Pool, 2009; Cumming and Dai, 2010; Ding et al., 2009). To identify hedge fund holdings, we 
manually match CISDM data with the ownership data from 13F filings available on Thomson Reuters. 
Manual matching is necessary as the two databases use different conventions to report firm names and 
often abbreviate common words such as “management” or “company”, which makes mechanical matching 
error prone. Having identified hedge funds on Thomson Reuters, we extract their quarterly positions. The 
number of unique hedge fund firms we identify increases from 233 in 2000 to 348 in 2011, peaking at 412 
before the financial crisis.8 Our final sample includes 374,615 target prices for 4,326 firms issued by 6,734 
analysts employed by 433 brokers.  
 
4. Evidence on bias in analyst target prices 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate results 
Panel A of Table 2 presents summary statistics. The average TP bias is 8.4% of the share price and 
increases to 11.6% when we benchmark TPs against share prices measured 6-month from the TP issue 
date. The average forecasted ex-dividend return is 12.7%, and for 42.2% of stocks the maximum share 
price over the next six months is smaller than the target price. The mean percentage TP revision is 0.6% 
and TP relative is 2.7%. The average investor turnover is 0.213, which means that 10.7% (0.213/2 = 
0.107) of the average investor’s portfolio is turned over in a quarter, which approximately translates to 
42.8% of the position being turned over in a given year.9 Institutional investors hold 64.2% of outstanding 
equity and the average hedge fund holdings are around 7.2%. The majority of the analysts (52.8%) are 
affiliated with an investment bank, and the average analyst in our sample has almost 7 years of experience 
                                                          
8 For comparison, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) use a sample of 53 unique hedge funds over period 1998–2000 
when they match 13F data with hedge fund information, Brav et al. (2008) use 236 hedge funds, and Cheng et al. 
(2012) use 435 hedge funds over the period 1994–2008. The sample in Brown and Schwarz (2013) comprises 102 
managers in 1999, increasing to 226 managers in 2008.  
9 The average investor turnover of 0.213 means that institutional investors hold an average stock in their portfolio for 
around 28 months (12/0.428 = 28.04).  
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and follows 16 firms. The average firm has $3.7 billion in market value, its book-to-market stands at 
0.584, and it is followed by close to 12 analysts. The coefficient of variation for the share price is 0.098, 
and the three-month momentum is 6.5%.  
Insert Table 2 around here 
Panel B of Table 2 presents statistics based on portfolios that double sort our firms using Inv_TR 
and IO. TP bias reduces as we move from low IO to high IO portfolios. This result is consistent with prior 
studies that highlight the mitigating effect of institutional ownership on analyst optimism (Frankel et al., 
2006; Ljungqvist et al., 2007). However, TP bias increases as we move from low to high Inv_TR 
portfolios. This happens whether we concentrate on high or low IO firms. Thus, we conclude that the 
effect of investor holding period is above and beyond the previously documented institutional ownership 
effect. The differences in TP bias between extreme turnover portfolios are both statistically and 
economically significant, consistent with our proposition that higher ownership by short-term investors 
increases optimism in analyst TPs. 
Panel C reports dual sorts based on IO and hedge fund ownership. Here, we split hedge funds into 
terciles because for a number of firms the average hedge fund holdings are zero. As before, we observe 
that TP optimism increases as we move from a portfolio of stocks with the lowest to the highest hedge 
fund ownership irrespective of the IO level. In untabulated results, we find that the decile with the highest 
hedge fund ownership has 39% higher Inv_Tr compared to the decile with the highest ownership by bank 
trust and pensions funds, which confirms both variables capture the same underlying construct.  
Panel D reports Pearson correlations between variables. All correlations between explanatory 
variables are comfortably below 0.8, which is the rule-of-thumb threshold for potential multicollinearity 
problems (Judge et al. 1982; Hill et al. 2012). 
To conclude the univariate analysis, Figure 1a reports mean quarterly TP bias for three portfolios 
split by Inv_TR. Average TP bias is calculated for three quarters centred on the quarter where we allocate 
stocks into the three Inv_TR portfolios (Inv_TR is calculated in the quarter preceding portfolio formation). 
Average TP bias is similar across the three portfolios in quarter −1, but increases markedly for stocks with 
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high short-term ownership in quarters 0 and 1, which is consistent with our prediction. To sharpen the 
analysis, Figure 1b reports changes in TP bias as a function of changes in Inv_TR measured one quarter 
earlier. We plot the graph for the top and bottom Inv_TR portfolios from Figure 1a. TP optimism increases 
as holdings by short-term investors in a stock increase. For long-term investors, there is little evidence of 
an increase in TP bias as they increase stock ownership. Together, the evidence in Figures 1a and 1b is 
inconsistent with short-term investors purchasing stocks for which analysts are on average optimistic. 
Rather, TP bias increases in response to higher holdings by short-term investors. Overall, univariate 
results are consistent with our conjecture that analysts bias their target prices to cater to the needs of 
frequently trading investors.  
Insert Figure 1 around here 
 
4.2 Multivariate results on the effect investor holding period has on target price optimism 
Panel A of Table 3 presents regression results for Equation (8) that models the effect investor holding 
period has on TP bias. Model 1 reports the effect Inv_TR has on TP bias after controlling for several 
analyst and firm characteristics. The Inv_TR coefficient is positive and highly significant (1.174; 
p<0.000). The impact of investor turnover on target price bias is economically significant and 
economically larger than the negative effect of institutional investor ownership. Specifically, a one 
standard deviation reduction in the holding period is associated with an increase in TP bias by 65.7% 
compared to the average level (results untabulated). This effect is opposite to and stronger (by 
approximately 18.2%) than the negative relation between TP bias and the percentage share ownership by 
institutional investors documented by Frankel et al. (2006) and Ljungqvist et al. (2007).10  
Model 2 repeats Equation (8) but uses hedge fund ownership to capture holdings by short-term 
investors. We find a highly statistically (0.557; p<0.000) and economically significant coefficient of hedge 
                                                          
10 We formally test that the magnitude of the investor turnover effect is higher than the magnitude of the institutional 
ownership effect by estimating Equation (8) where we first standardize all variables to have a mean of 0 and a 
standard deviation of 1. We reject the null that the coefficient on Inv_TR equals the absolute value of the IO 
coefficient, i.e., the absolute magnitudes of the two effects are different.  
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fund holdings. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in hedge fund ownership is associated with 
an increase in TP bias by around 64% compared to the average level. This evidence corroborates the 
conclusion that analysts increase optimism in their TPs in the presence of short-term investors. 
Models 3 and 4 report Equation (8) when we use the ex-ante TP optimism measure, TP/P adj. The 
conclusions from these regressions are the same as from the TP bias measure, which suggests our 
inferences are not sensitive to the choice of an ex-post TP bias measure.  
Models 5 and 6 repeat Equation (8) but with changes in TP bias and short-term ownership (ΔTP 
bias and ΔInv_TR or Δ%HF ownership). The conclusions from the regressions in changes are the same as 
for our main regressions and consistent with the evidence in Figure 1b. Thus, a regression in changes 
confirms that analysts react to changes in investor holdings. This result is important because regressions in 
changes are less likely to suffer from omitted correlated variable problems (Skinner 1996).  
The negative coefficient on Inv_bank in Models 1 to 4 shows that it is analysts at brokers without 
an investment banking arm that produce more biased TP forecasts. This result is consistent with IB 
analysts building a reputation for accurate research that promotes future investment banking transactions 
(Jackson, 2005; Cowen et al., 2006; Jacob et al., 2008).11 The negative coefficient is also present on the 
interaction term between Inv_bank and Inv_TR (result untabulated). These results reflect that analysts 
working for non IB brokers (1) depend more on trade commissions than brokers with investment banking 
arms, who diversify income sources, and (2) face lower reputational cost of issuing biased forecasts 
compared to IB analysts as optimistic forecasts reduce the likelihood of future investment banking 
transactions, which are more important to the latter group (Ljungqvist et al., 2006; Jackson, 2005). 
Insert Table 3 around here 
The signs and significance of control variables are in line with prior studies. The coefficients on 
analyst following and on the book-to-market ratio are negative, suggesting that higher competition among 
analysts reduces bias in analyst TPs and that analysts tend to be less optimistic about the prospects of 
                                                          
11 A regression in changes factors out the influence of constant variables, which explains why Inv_bank, is not 
significant in Models 5 and 6.  
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firms with lower growth options. Higher stock return volatility and firm size have a positive effect on TP 
bias, which is consistent with the evidence for stock recommendations in Agrawal and Chen (2008) and 
for target prices in Bradshaw et al. (2013, 2014). The former result indicates that bias in analyst TPs may 
be more difficult to detect when uncertainty is high, and the latter result suggests analysts may be more 
willing to issue biased forecasts to please managers from larger firms (Lim, 2001).  
Panel B of Table 3 report results when we estimate Equation (8) using the other proxies for TP 
optimism, namely, TP bias 2, TP relative, TP_not_met, and ΔTP as dependent variables. The conclusions 
from these tests are similar compared to using the TP bias measure (for brevity, we report results for 
Inv_TR, however, the conclusions are the same for percentage hedge fund ownership). Further, Model 5 in 
Panel B examines analyst catering behaviour on the short-side. We test this proposition by including the 
percentage short-interest in Equation (8). We collect monthly short-interest data from Compustat 
Supplemental Short Interest File and scale it by the number of shares outstanding. We then use monthly 
values to calculate quarterly averages for the quarter preceding the quarter where we measure TP bias. The 
coefficient on short-interest is negative and significant, consistent with higher shorting activity 
incentivizing analysts to produce less optimistic target prices. This result suggests that catering happens 
both on the long and the short side.  
Table 3 results may reflect analyst genuine over-optimism about stocks with high holdings by 
short-term investors rather than strategic distortions. To distinguish between the two explanations, we 
compare bias in analyst TPs to that in EPS forecasts for EPS forecasts issued jointly with the target price. 
If our findings in Table 3 are manifestations of inherent biases in analyst forecasts, that is, genuine 
optimism about prospects of firms with high short-term investors, then both TP and EPS bias should 
increase for stocks with high ownership by short-term investors. If our findings reflect analyst catering, we 
should observe a positive bias in analyst target prices, but not in earnings estimates. We follow previous 
literature (Das et al., 1998; Richardson et al., 2004) and measure EPS bias as the signed difference 
between the forecasted, one-year-ahead EPS and the actual EPS, scaled by the stock price measured two 
days before the TP issue date. This ensures consistent scaler for TP and EPS forecast bias. We do not find 
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a significant association between Inv_TR and EPS bias, which suggests our results are more likely to 
capture analyst catering. Together, Table 3 results present consistent evidence on higher optimism in 
analyst target prices in the presence of short-term investors such as hedge funds.12   
 
5. Endogeneity and sensitivity tests 
In this section, we first address the concern that our results may reflect endogeneity in the choice of stocks 
short-term investors invest in or unobserved heterogeneity in analyst behaviour. Then, we discuss several 
specifications of Equation (8), which confirm that our results are not driven by alternative explanations.  
 
5.1 Endogeneity concerns 
We acknowledge that our results can reflect different investment strategies of short-term compared to 
long-term investors. In particular, short-term investors may select firms where analysts tend to issue more 
biased TPs in the hope of exploiting potential stock misvaluation, e.g., short-term investors may favour 
growth stocks with higher cash flow uncertainty where analysts issue more optimistic forecasts. To 
address this concern, we run three tests: (1) we use instrumental variable regressions, (2) regressions with 
firm- and analyst-fixed effects to capture unobserved heterogeneity in firm and analyst characteristics, and 
(3) a natural experiment related to the 2008 Lehman Brothers collapse. We acknowledge that despite our 
best efforts endogeneity concerns can never be fully addressed, which is a common caveat in this line of 
research. 
                                                          
12 Our results from Table 3 do not generalize the findings in Firth et al. (2013) and Gu et al. (2013), who report that 
Chinese brokers issue optimistic stock recommendations for their mutual fund clients. Their results are unsurprising 
because institutional investors in China do not moderate optimism in analyst forecasts. Contrary to the US evidence 
in Ljungqvist et al. (2007), Cheng et al. (2006), and Brown et al. (2014), Gu et al. (2013) report that high mutual 
fund ownership in China increases optimism in analyst stock recommendations, and the bias is incremental when 
brokers receive trading commissions from mutual funds. The difference in results in Firth et al. (2013) and Gu et al. 
(2013) compared to US studies reflect differences in the institutional setup: there are fewer funds and brokers in 
China compared to the US (e.g., Gu et al. report an average of 51 funds and 69 brokers) and brokers specialize in 
catering to few select funds (e.g., Gu et al. classify over 70% of brokers’ mutual fund clients as affiliated). The 
concentrated market structure reduces competition between brokers for new clients and analyst incentives to issue 
accurate forecasts to attract new clients. Consistent with this prediction, Gu et al. (2013) report that over 85% of 
stock recommendations in their sample are classified as either strong buy/buy.   
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Table 4 reports 2SLS regression results, which we run to control for endogeneity in the choice of 
stocks by short-term investors. We use two instrumental variables, one firm-related and one investor-
related. The firm-related instrument is a dividend dummy that takes the value of one if a firm pays a 
dividend, and zero otherwise. We expect a firm’s payout policy to be a significant determinant of investor 
stock choices. Some long-term investors such as public and corporate pension funds, colleges and 
universities, labour unions, foundations, and other corporations are either fully or largely exempt from 
dividend taxes, which increases their incentive to hold dividend-paying stocks (Allen et al., 2000). Thus, 
the dividend dummy meets the relevance condition. However, it is unlikely that dividend policy will have 
a first order impact on temporary TP bias. Consistent with this prediction, Asquith et al. (2005) find that 
justifications supporting an analyst’s opinion include references to share repurchases, but not dividend 
payments. Thus, we feel that the dividend dummy meets the exclusion restriction and is a valid instrument 
in our setting.  
Following Edmans et al. (2012) and Michaely and Vincent (2013), our investor-related instrument 
is MFFlow. MFFlow captures the implied mutual fund trades, which are induced by flows by their own 
investors. Specifically, MFFlow for firm k in quarter q is: 
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
     (9) 
where Ff,q is the total outflow from fund f in quarter q, TAf,q-1 is the fund f’’s total assets at the end of the 
previous quarter, , , 1 , 1k f q k qShares P− −  is the dollar value of fund f’’s holdings of stock k, and VOLk,q, is 
the total dollar trading volume of stock k in quarter q. The sum of flows is over funds for which quarterly 
investor outflows equal or exceed 5% of fund f’’s total assets.13 The idea behind this instrument is that 
significant investor outflows will force mutual funds to liquidate a portion of their holdings to repay their 
investors. This will affect a firm’s Inv_TR but for reasons unrelated to the firm. Further, because mutual 
and hedge fund flows are correlated (Sialm et al., 2012), MFFlow can also capture hedge flow outflows, 
                                                          
13 The definition of MFFlow follows Edmans et al. (2012), Appendix A. We have downloaded this variable from 
Alex Edman’s website: http://faculty.london.edu/aedmans/ (accessed March 2014). 
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which lead to exogenous variation in hedge fund ownership. Hence, MFFlow is an ideal instrument in our 
setting meeting the relevance condition. However, investor outflows should not affect analyst forecasts as 
these are based on company fundamentals. Thus, the instrument meets the exclusion restriction as well.14 
The 2SLS results in Table 4 confirm our previous findings. In particular, the Inv_TR and %HF 
ownership coefficients are positive in both models. Thus, our conclusions from Section 4 are robust to 
endogeneity in the choice of firms by short-term investors.  
Insert Table 4 around here 
Next, we examine if unobserved heterogeneity in analyst behaviour affects our conclusions. To 
illustrate, our results in Table 3 may reflect that analysts with past experience working for short-term 
investors, such as hedge funds, may be prone to issue more optimistic target prices for stocks with high 
ownership by short-term investors. Thus, it could be (unobserved) past analyst experience that explains 
higher bias, and not short-term holdings. To address the concern that unobserved analyst characteristics 
affect our conclusions, we repeat Equation (8) but now include analyst fixed effects. Column “Analyst 
FE” in Table 4 reports the results. We continue to find a significant relation between investor turnover and 
TP bias after controlling for analyst fixed effects, which corroborates our conclusions from Table 3. The 
conclusions are similar when we repeat the analysis using hedge fund holdings (results untabulated). 
Column “Firm FE” reports results for Equation (8) where we include firm fixed effects to control 
for unobserved firm characteristics that can affect analyst propensity to issue more optimistic target prices. 
After controlling for firm fixed effects, we continue to find a strong relation between short-term investor 
holdings and optimism in analyst target prices and the coefficient on Inv_TR is even slightly larger than in 
Table 3. Repeating the analysis using hedge fund holdings leaves our conclusions unchanged (results 
untabulated). 
Our third test takes advantage of the quasi-natural experiment related to the collapse of Lehman 
                                                          
14 The two instruments are valid in our tests. For both models presented in Table 4, the Sargan-Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions does not reject the null that the instruments are valid. Also, the F-statistic of 411.5 
comfortably rejects the hypothesis that the instruments are weak (Stock et al. (2002) advocate that the F-statistic 
should exceed 10 for inference based on the 2SLS estimator to be reliable when there is one endogenous regressor). 
21 
 
Brothers in September 2008. The collapse of the bank exposed significant fragility of the financial system 
and risk that some prime brokers would not survive to execute future trades. The uncertainty about 
whether some brokers would survive to execute future trades led many investors to switch to the safety of 
large reputable brokers, thus limiting the choice of brokers to channel trades through. Mackintosh (2008) 
indicates that around 100 hedge funds used Lehman Brothers as their prime broker and relied largely on 
the firm for financing. Upon the bank’s collapse, their assets were frozen forcing hedge funds to fire-sale 
their assets. Mackintosh (2008) highlights that the Lehman Brothers collapse prompted hedge funds to 
reassess the riskiness of their prime brokers with many switching to large banks to ensure availability of 
financing and continuation in stock execution. We explore this exogenous shock to the broker choice in 
our tests. We expect that the sensitivity of TP bias to short-term investor holdings reduced after Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy as investors that would normally choose catering brokers sought the safety of large 
investment banks. For this test, we create an indicator variable Lehman, which takes a value of one in the 
two-year period after the Lehman Brothers collapse, and zero in the two-year period before September 
2008. We then interact this variable with the investor turnover measure. The last column of Table 4 
reports the relevant regression results. Consistent with our prediction, we document weaker association 
between optimism in analyst target prices and investor turnover after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. 
The indicator Lehman is negative, which suggests that on average TP optimism reduced after Lehman’s 
collapse. Together, tests in this section suggest that our conclusion on the positive effect short-term 
investors have on analyst propensity to bias their target prices is not due to the endogeneity in the choice 
of firms these investors hold or other confounding explanations driven by omitted variables. 
 
5.2 Alternative explanations and additional tests 
Our main regressions are at firm-broker level, which averages churn ratios across all investors holding the 
stock. To sharpen the analysis, we also repeat the analysis at investor-firm-broker level. Like our main 
prediction, we expect analysts to cater more to investors classified as short-term, which we capture by 
investor-specific quarterly stock turnover measured across all investor’s holdings, Investor TR. We also 
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measure the importance of a stock in an investor’s portfolio. Portfolio importance is the ratio of an 
investor’s ownership in a stock scaled by the sum of all holdings. Ownership concentration is the ratio of 
an investor’s holding in a stock scaled by the total institutional ownership in that stock. To capture the 
blockholding effect specific to short-term investors, we interact Portfolio importance and Ownership 
concentration with Investor TR. We expect analysts to issue more optimistic target prices for more 
important and concentrated ownership by short-term investors measured at the investor and stock level. 
Analysts should be more likely to cater in cases an investor incurred a loss on a stock. Specifically, Loss 
on stock is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the market-adjusted return on a stock over the quarter is 
negative and 0 otherwise. Finally, we control for whether the holding period of an investor is shorter than 
that of a representative investor in a stock. Specifically, we create an indicator variable Investor TR > 
Inv_TR equal to 1 if the individual investor turnover is higher than that of a representative investor and 0 
otherwise.  
 Table 5 reports results for investor-firm-broker level regressions. Model 1 confirms that analysts 
cater to short-term investors by issuing optimistic target prices and the effect is incremental to the 
aggregate investor turnover measure. Model 2 documents that analysts cater more if an investor 
experienced a loss on a stock; from an investor perspective, analyst catering is particularly valuable in 
such cases. Model 3 documents more optimistic target prices when a higher proportion of an investor’s 
wealth is allocated to a stock and Model 4 reports more optimistic target prices for investors with higher 
blockholding in a stock. Both results are consistent with analysts catering more strongly when an 
investment in a stock is more important to an investor. Jointly, Table 5 results are consistent with our main 
analysis.  
Insert Table 5 around here 
 In additional tests, we perform a battery of tests to confirm our main results, dismiss alternative 
explanations and showcase the robustness of our conclusions. We summarize these results here without 
tabulating. 
• We document a negative association between TP optimism (changes in TP optimism) and a dummy 
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variable for low short-term investor holdings (an indicator variable for a reduction in short-term 
institutional holdings), which suggests that analysts may also obscure their TPs by issuing low-ball 
estimates when short-term holdings are low (reducing).  
• To ensure our results are not a manifestation of a correlation between stock liquidity and TP bias, we 
include stock turnover in Equation (8) and find consistent evidence. 
• We find that our results are unchanged when we control for bias in analyst earnings forecasts 
calculated in a similar way to TP bias. Thus, the effect we identify does not reflect common sources 
of bias in analyst earnings forecasts, such as the earnings walk down (Richardson et al., 2004).  
• We find that our results are unchanged when we control for management guidance, which may 
induce TP optimism (Cotter et al., 2006). This result suggests that our results do not capture instances 
where analysts issue optimistic forecasts to please a firm’s management (e.g., Lim, 2001; Koch et al., 
2013). 
• Our results could capture persistence in TP optimism that correlates with short-term investor stock 
picks. To test this prediction, we re-run Equation (8) controlling for past TP bias and find no change 
to our conclusion. Thus, our results do not capture instances where short-term investors invest into 
stocks for which analysts have been optimistic in the past. 
• We repeat our main analysis after excluding a 5-day window centred on earnings announcements and 
find consistent evidence. This result suggests that our conclusions are not due to the confounding 
effect of new information revealed at earnings announcements.  
• We find that our results persist after 2002. In 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
introduced sweeping changes to the rules related to the production, utilization and compensation for 
analyst research (NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472). These rules aimed to reduce conflicts of 
interest arising from investment banking transactions in analyst research that led to unduly optimistic 
recommendations during the internet bubble period (Boni and Womack, 2003; Barber et al., 2006). 
• We confirm that our focus on TPs, as opposed to stock recommendations, is appropriate in our 
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setting. We document that controlling for TP optimism, Inv_TR does not affect the probability of 
having an optimistic stock recommendation. This result confirms that analysts channel their bias 
through TPs, not stock recommendations, when they cater to short-term investors.  
• Consistent with the prediction that analysts that face higher reputational costs for catering are less 
likely to issue optimistic TPs, we find that Institutional Investor All-America Research Team star 
analysts are less likely to produce optimistic TPs. All-America (Star) analysts are more likely to be 
employed by investment banks because their presence has a bearing on the choice of the investment 
advisor in security offerings (Hong and Kubik, 2003; Hong et al., 2000; Ljungqvist et al., 2006; 
Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Dunbar, 2000). 
  
6. Do investors see through distortions in analyst TPs? 
Our evidence suggests that analysts bias their TPs for stocks with high short-term institutional ownership. 
Next, we examine if investors see through analyst incentives and discount TPs issued for these firms. If 
the catering strategy is successful and investors do not see through the bias, we expect non-negative 
market reactions for TP revisions in firms with higher levels of investor turnover. To examine this 
proposition, we consider price reactions to percentage target price (ΔTP) revisions by analyst a for firm k 
on day d, and how these vary with investor turnover. Following Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007, 
2014), our model has the form: 

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We use a three-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) centred on each TP announcement date to 
measure the price response to target price revisions. We expect the coefficient on ΔTP to be positive if 
target prices have incremental information content (Brav and Lehavy 2003, Asquith et al. 2005). Further, 
if analysts’ strategy of biasing target prices for stocks with high ownership by short-term investors is 
successful, the interaction term ΔTP*Inv_TR should be non-negative. For robustness, we also estimate 
Equation (10) when we interact revisions in analyst target prices with hedge fund ownership, ΔTP*%HF 
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ownership. We focus on a short window around TP announcement because previous studies suggest 
investors react quickly to information revealed in the target price (Brav and Lehavy 2003, Asquith et al. 
2005, Da and Schaumburg 2011). Therefore, optimistic TPs should lead to temporary overvaluation in a 
relatively short window after the forecast issue, which creates a “window of opportunity” for short-term 
investors to sell their holdings. We use the CRSP value-weighted index as the benchmark to measure 
abnormal returns.  
Prior studies have shown that investors react to revisions in analyst earnings forecast (ΔEPS) and 
that changes in stock recommendations also lead to significant market reactions (Asquith et al., 2005), 
thus we control for ΔEPS as well as negative (Downgrade) and positive (Upgrade) changes in stock 
recommendations. We require that the forecasts used to calculate revisions are no more than 300 days 
apart and that the revisions in EPS are for the same fiscal year. The former criterion eliminates 
infrequently revised forecasts and the latter ensures forecast revisions reflect only analyst new information 
for a fiscal year. These additional selection criteria reduce the sample size to 283,763 observations. Price 
reactions and forecast revisions are measured in the next quarter compared to the quarter where we 
measure investor holdings, which avoids simultaneity. Our conclusions are unchanged when we measure 
investor holdings in the concurrent quarter. Similarly to past studies (e.g., Keung, 2010), we assume that 
the EPS forecast revision is zero for stand-alone TPs. 
Panel A of Table 6 provides descriptive statistics on positive (Panel A1) and negative (Panel A2) 
TP revisions during our sample period. The average positive target price revision is 15.27% and associates 
with a market reaction of 2.31%. In contrast, the average negative target price revision is approximately 
−16.35% and associates with a market reaction of −3.11%.  
Insert Table 6 around here 
Model 1 in Panel B of Table 6 documents significant price reaction to TP announcements 
controlling for revisions in analyst earnings forecasts and stock recommendation. This result is consistent 
with past evidence that TP announcements convey valuable new information (e.g., Brav and Lehavy 2003, 
Asquith et al. 2005). Importantly, Model 2 illustrates that the coefficient on the interaction term 
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ΔTP*Inv_TR is non-negative. This result suggests that price-setters do not see though analyst catering and 
do not discount target prices issued for stocks with high short-term ownership where TP are optimistic. 
Model 3 reports similar evidence for hedge fund holdings.15 Table 6 results confirm that biased TPs lead 
to temporary price increases in stocks held predominantly by short-term investors. This creates “windows 
of opportunities” for short-term investors to sell their temporarily overpriced holdings.16 
 
6.1 Long-run abnormal returns following TP issuance 
If analysts “pump” stocks held by short-term investors, we should observe more disappointing returns 
subsequent to the forecast issue compared to stocks where analysts do not engage in catering. In other 
words, analysts trade off the investment value of their forecasts for higher bias that caters to short-term 
investor needs. To test this prediction, we examine Jensen’s alphas from regressing 12 months of daily 
returns on the Carhart (1997) model. Specifically, each quarter, we allocate stocks to three portfolios 
formed on investor turnover and three portfolios formed on the ratio of market-adjusted TP/P. We use 
TP/P adj as the measure is not affected by changes in stock price after portfolio formation, however, our 
conclusions are unchanged when we use our main TP bias measure or market unadjusted TP/P. We then 
regress 250 daily returns, the average number of trading days in a year, for each stock in a portfolio on the 
four-factor model and calculate average alpha, which captures mean daily abnormal returns.   
 Panel C of Table 6 reports average intercepts from the four-factor regressions. For the portfolio of 
                                                          
15 The non-negative coefficient on ΔTP*Inv_TR is consistent with the evidence in Malmendier and Shanthikumar 
(2007, 2014), who document that investors, particularly small traders, react more strongly to affiliated analysts’ stock 
recommendation upgrades (Malmendier and Shanthikumar 2007) and revisions (Malmendier and Shanthikumar 
2014), which tend to be biased. They predict that “small investors might not seek information about analyst 
distortions even if the costs of obtaining such information are low. They take recommendations at face value and 
trust analysts too much” Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007, 458).  
16 One could argue that short-term investors may benefit more from privileged private disclosure of analyst TPs 
rather than from the analyst attempting to “pump” the market. Three facts counter this argument. First, using daily 
volume data, Juergens and Lindsey (2009) do not find evidence that analysts working for a market-maker pre-release 
reports on their stock upgrades to benefit privileged clients. Second, market regulation, e.g., Nasdaq Rule 2110-4 that 
governs trades in anticipation of analyst reports, may limit private disclosure if this activity can attract the regulator’s 
attention. Third, private disclosure only does not guarantee profitable trades if the market price does not change. 
Thus, it is unclear how short-term investors benefit from private disclosure of overly biased TPs. Rather, it is public 
disclosure of optimistic TPs that temporarily increase stock valuations that maximizes the likelihood of beneficial 
trade for short-term investors.  
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stocks held predominantly by long-term investors, low Inv_TR, we observe that alphas increase as we 
move from the portfolio of low to high forecasted returns, TP/P adj. As target prices in the low Inv_TR 
portfolio are unaffected by short-term investor pressure to issue optimistic forecasts, the trend in abnormal 
returns is consistent with valuable investment advice conveyed by analyst target prices (Brav and Lehavy, 
2003; Huang et al., 2009). However, for portfolios with high short-term ownership, abnormal returns for 
the high TP/P adj stocks are significantly lower compared to the low TP/P adj stocks.17 These results are 
consistent with TPs for stocks with high short-term ownership being tainted by pressure from short-term 
investors to bias these forecasts, which reduces their investment value. A corroborating result is also 
evident when we look at high TP/P adj stocks and observe significantly lower abnormal returns when 
moving from the portfolio of stocks with low to high short-term ownership, consistent with the latter TPs 
being less credible. Panel D repeats the analysis for sorts on hedge fund ownership and produces similar 
evidence to Panel C. 
Analysts may hesitate to issue unfavourable target prices for fear of hurting short-term investors 
and losing their business. Thus, their less favourable opinions about stocks held by short-term investors 
should be more credible. Consistent with this prediction, the difference in returns on high compared to low 
Inv_TR portfolio for the low TP/P adj stocks is positive and significant. This result is consistent with 
investors anticipating analyst behaviour and considering less favourable opinions about stocks with high 
short-term ownership to be comparatively more credible, further supporting our catering story.   
 
6.2 Do short-term investors sell their temporarily overpriced holdings? 
Next, we examine if short-term investors act on biased TPs and exit from stocks where analyst optimistic 
TPs lead to temporary price increases. The new regression model, which we estimate at firm level, has the 
form 
                                                          
17 The magnitudes of abnormal returns are comparable with other studies that examine returns to trading strategies 
based on analyst forecasts. To illustrate, Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) report daily abnormal returns of 
−0.04% to −0.07% for a zero-investment portfolio of recommendations issued by affiliated compared to unaffiliated 
analysts. 
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where the dependent variable is the one-quarter ahead IO, and the prefix “Avg” indicates a firm-quarter 
average. We regress future institutional ownership on the mean TP bias of all TPs issued for a firm in a 
quarter, Avg TP bias_f, and an interaction term between Avg_TP_bias_f and Inv_TR. We expect to find a 
negative coefficient on Avg TP bias_f *Inv_TR if the reduction in future institutional holdings is higher 
among stocks owned by short-term investors when analysts issue optimistic TPs. We examine investor 
holdings one quarter ahead rather than shortly around TP announcement because institutional holdings are 
available on a quarterly basis. This setup biases against finding significant results as we would expect 
short-term investor trading to happen shortly around the TP announcement. For robustness, we also 
estimate Equation (11) where the dependent variable is (1) the future institutional ownership by short-term 
investors, (2) the future institutional ownership by long-term investors, (3) the number of future 
institutional investors, and (4) the number of future hedge funds in a stock. We use the median quarterly 
median investor turnover, Inv_TR, to identify stocks owned predominantly by short-term vs. long-term 
investors.  
Model 1 in Table 7 reports results for Equation (11) without the interaction term 
Avg_TP_bias_f*Inv_TR. The coefficient on Avg TP bias_f is negative and significant indicating that, on 
average, high TP bias today translates into lower institutional holdings next quarter. This evidence is 
consistent with the conclusion in Ljungqvist et al. (2007) that institutional investors reduce holdings in 
stocks where analysts issue misleading reports.  
Insert Table 7 around here 
Model 2 includes the interaction term Avg_TP_bias_f*Inv_TR and its negative coefficient 
suggests that it is short-term investors who reduce their holdings for stocks with optimistic TPs. 
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Ownership by long-term investors does not change when analysts issue optimistic target prices as 
evidenced by the zero coefficient on Avg TP bias_f. Thus, it is short-term investors who sell their holdings 
to retail investors. 
To sharpen the analysis, Models 3 and 4 report regression results for Equation (11) where we split 
future ownership into ownership by short-term and long-term investors, respectively, using quarterly 
median investor turnover. In other words, the column Future holdings by short-term investors captures 
institutional holdings where the quarterly Inv_Tr is below median. For Model 3, the significant negative 
coefficient on the interaction term Avg_TP_bias_f*Inv_TR confirms that when analysts produce 
optimistic target prices for stocks currently owned by short-term investors, future short-term ownership of 
these stocks reduces. The interaction term is not distinguishable from zero in Model 4, which suggests that 
future long-term ownership in stocks with predominantly short-term ownership does not change in 
response to optimistic target prices. These results corroborate the conclusion that short-term investors sell 
their holdings to retail investors.  
The conclusion that short-term investors reduce their holdings in stocks where analysts produce 
optimistic target prices is unchanged when we use (1) the number of future institutional investors (Model 
5) and (2) the number of future hedge funds (Models 6 and 7) as the dependent variables. We run these 
robustness tests because future percentage holdings can change even if the number of investors holding 
the stock remains constant. The economic effects that we document in Table 7 are significant. To 
illustrate, using Model 6, a one standard deviation increase in TP bias for stocks with large hedge fund 
ownership is associated with a reduction in the future number of hedge funds holding the stock by 45.2%. 
In unreported result, we find that our conclusions are qualitatively the same when we use the ex-ante 
measure of TP bias, TP/P adj, which suggests our conclusion is not affected by the way we measure target 
price optimism. Together, Table 7 results confirm that short-term institutional investors take advantage of 
“windows of opportunities” created by biased TPs to offload their equity positions to retail investors. 
These results also preclude an alternative explanation for our results, namely that analysts identify 
underpriced stocks and short-term investors trade on this information—if analysts identify underpriced 
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stocks with high future returns, short-term investors should be increasing their holdings. 
Our result that retail investors do not see through biased analyst forecasts and are net purchasers 
of stocks from short-term investors is consistent with past evidence. Mikhail et al. (2007) document that 
small investors are more easily misled by analysts than large investors and are net purchasers following 
recommendation revisions regardless of the type of recommendation. Malmendier and Shanthikumar 
(2007) document that retail investors follow analyst stock recommendations literally, trade in the direction 
of the recommendation, and their trades exert price pressures that lead to significant abnormal price 
reactions at stock recommendation announcements. However, large traders adjust for bias in analyst stock 
recommendations.   
Three reasons can explain myopic retail investors’ investment patterns and why retail investors do 
not learn over time. First, retail investors face high information acquisitions costs. For example, retail 
investors do not have the time to analyse vast quantities of public data and access to information though 
portals, such as Bloomberg, is costly for them. Further, target prices available through open financial 
portals such as finance.yahoo.com or finance.google.com may be available at a lag and at consensus rather 
than analyst level, which means retail investors have more stale and less precise information. Second, 
retail investors can attribute their poor trade choices to bad luck and timing. Consistent with this 
prediction, Barberis et al. (1998) and Cohen et al. (2002) report that retail investors are slow to incorporate 
new information into prices and Griffin et al. (2011) document that retail investors were net buyers and 
institutional investors net sellers at the peak of the internet bubble. Third, investors may not distinguish 
between bias and error in analyst TPs and attribute poor trade performance to high inaccuracy of analyst 
TPs. Consistent with this intuition, Bradshaw et al. (2016) report that analysts strategically produce more 
optimistic forecasts in instances where the forecasting difficulty is higher. They document that because 
earnings forecasting difficulty is higher compared to revenue forecasting, analysts can easier justify 
optimistic earnings than revenue forecasts.   
 
 
31 
 
6.3 Do short-term investors reward brokers for their catering behaviour? 
Catering to short-term investors must benefit the analyst’s broker in the form of higher future “soft 
dollars” in trade commissions.18 Though we cannot directly observe how investors allocate their trades 
across brokers, we propose an indirect test based on whether short-term investors increase their holdings 
in other stocks covered by the catering broker. Brokers tend to cover stocks with high expected trade 
commissions (Jackson, 2005; Brown et al., 2015; Niehaus and Zhang, 2010; Green et al., 2014). Hence, if 
short-term investors increase holdings in other stocks covered by the catering broker, we can expect that at 
least some of their trades will be channelled through the broker. If short-term investors do not increase 
holdings in other stocks covered by the catering broker, or avoid these stocks, it is hard to argue that 
catering benefits the broker. As brokers employ multiple analysts who in turn cover several stocks, there is 
an opportunity for a repeated game as short-term investors anticipate future catering behaviour for the 
newly purchased stocks. Importantly, catering to existing clients can also attract new clients who 
anticipate similar analyst behaviour in the future for other stocks.  
Equation (12) describes the regression model we use to investigate whether issuing optimistic 
target prices for stocks held predominantly by short-term investors increases these investors’ holdings of 
other stocks covered by the broker. Specifically, the dependent variable is the average one-quarter ahead 
institutional ownership of all stocks (excluding firm k) covered by broker b, Avg IO otherb,-k,q+1, and the 
regression model is 
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18 “Soft dollar” payments is a standard practice where institutional investors commit to (1) allot their trading volume 
to brokers where sell-side analysts provide valuable service and (2) pay a fixed five to six cent-per-share commission 
fee that is higher than the typical marginal cost of trading (Goldstein et al., 2009; Juergens and Lindsey, 2009; Maber 
et al., 2014). The UK Financial Conduct Authority estimates that “UK investment managers pay an estimated £3bn 
of dealing commissions per year to brokers, with around £1.5bn of this spent on research.”, (Financial Conduct 
Authority, 2014b, 5). Buy-side institutions that manage portfolios for their clients favour “soft dollars”, rather than 
explicit payments for research reports, since the cost of the former is born by the client, whereas the latter would 
have to be paid from the buy-side institution’s own capital (Maber et al., 2014).  
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The model regresses future average IO holdings of other stocks covered by a broker on average 
TP bias of all TPs issued by a broker for firm k in a quarter, Avg TP bias_b, and an interaction term 
between Avg_TP_bias_b and investor turnover for firm k, Avg_TP_bias_b*Inv_TR. If short-term 
investors reward catering brokers with more future trades, we expect a positive coefficient on this 
interaction term. This is because we anticipate that investors are more likely to channel at least some of 
their trades on stock covered by catering analysts through the brokers these analysts work for.  
The model controls for Inv_TR and IO for stock k. We control for current mean institutional 
ownership of all stocks (excluding firm k) covered by the broker b, Avg IO otherb,-k,q, as we expect some 
persistence in institutional holdings of other stocks covered by a broker across quarters. Including Avg IO 
otherb,-k,q also helps control for investors’ choice of brokers. To illustrate, γ5 captures instances when an 
investor chooses broker b because this is a prime broker for a large number of stocks.  
Model 1 in Table 8 reports estimates for Equation (12). The negative coefficient on 
Avg_TP_bias_b indicates that, on average, institutional investors reduce holdings in other stocks covered 
by broker b if the broker produces optimistic target prices for stock k. This evidence is consistent with the 
conclusion in Frankel et al. (2006) and Ljungqvist et al. (2007) that institutional investors penalize brokers 
that produce biased research. The positive coefficient on the interaction term Avg TP bias_b*Inv_TR 
suggests that short-term investors increase their holdings in other stocks covered by the broker that caters 
to them in stock k. Though indirect, this evidence is consistent with short-term investors rewarding 
catering brokers with more future trades in other stocks covered by this broker.  
To corroborate the conjecture that short-term investors reward catering brokers with more future 
trades in this broker’s other covered stocks, we repeat Equation (12) when we split Avg IO other into 
future holdings by short-term investors (Model 2) and by long-term investors (Model 3). This split is 
similar to Table 7. We observe that the positive coefficient on the interaction term Avg TP bias_b*Inv_TR 
is present only for Model 2, which confirms that it is short-term investors who increase their holdings in 
other stocks covered by the catering broker.   
Insert Table 8 around here 
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To strengthen our inferences, we also re-estimate Equation (12) using hedge fund holdings. 
Specifically, the dependent variable is the average one-quarter ahead hedge fund holdings of other stocks 
covered by broker b (i.e., stocks covered by broker b excluding firm k), Avg HF otherb,-k,q+1, and we 
regress it on %HF ownership in stock k and its interaction with Avg TP bias_b for stock k. The positive 
coefficient on the interaction term Avg TP bias_b*%HF ownership in Model 4 confirms that hedge funds 
increase their future holdings in other stocks covered by the catering broker.19 Together, Table 8 results 
are consistent with the view that catering brokers could benefit from higher future trade commissions.20 In 
unreported results, we performed two additional tests. First, we estimated Equation (12) for a sample of 
brokers with unchanged stock coverage between consecutive quarters and find consistent evidence. This 
result suggests Table 8 evidence is not due to changes in brokers’ stock coverage. Second, we used 
changes in quarterly holdings as the dependent variable in Equation (12), which assumes complete 
persistence in holdings, i.e., γ5=1. These regressions produce conclusions similar to Table 8. However, we 
acknowledge that despite our best efforts, we can only produce an indirect test that investors reward 
catering brokers with their trades and we caution against the causal interpretation of this result.  
 
7. Conclusions 
This study examines the effect the investment horizon of institutional investors has on bias in analyst 
target prices. We document that for stocks with high short-term institutional ownership, analysts bias their 
TPs and that the bias is largely concentrated among analysts not working for brokers with an investment 
banking arm, which reflects lower marginal cost of reputation loss from issuing biased TPs for these 
analysts. Investors fail on average to see through analyst incentives and do not discount biased TPs issued 
for stocks with high short-term ownership. Short-term investors take advantage of temporary stock price 
                                                          
19 The small coefficient on %HF ownership other reflects that hedge funds trade frequently and have holdings across 
multiple brokers. 
20We expect analyst and broker incentives to maximize fees to align as analysts are compensated from the fees 
brokers receive from share trading (see also Jackson, 2005; Cowen et al., 2006; Beyer and Guttman, 2011). Thus, 
analysts would not object issuing biased research. Further, analysts have an incentive to produce optimistic research 
as this can lead to more favourable career outcomes (Hong and Kubik 2003; Horton et al. 2017).  
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increases and sell their shares to retail investors. We also find evidence consistent with short-term 
investors rewarding brokers engaging in catering with more future trades channelled through the broker. 
The evidence that brokers cater to short-term investors, such as hedge funds, is consistent with the survey 
evidence in Brown et al. (2015) and anecdotal evidence. For example, Schack (2003, 3) quotes the 
director of equity research at ABN AMRO saying “[W]all Street caters to the hedge funds and the high-
turnover funds. It doesn't even cater to long-term-oriented institutions like us. We typically own a stock 
anywhere from three to five years. But the Street has to play to the paying customer, and the paying 
customer now is hedge funds and the hot money. We're not trading enough to make anyone rich.”. The 
catering behaviour we document is permissible within the current US regulatory regime. This contrasts the 
European setting where the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II that came into force on 3rd 
January 2018 unbundles research payments from trade executions. 
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Figure 1. Mean quarterly level and change in TP bias for stocks split by investor turnover 
 
 
Figure 1a reports mean quarterly TP bias for stocks split into terciles by investor turnover. The averages are 
calculated for three quarters centered on the quarter where we allocate stocks into the three investor turnover groups. 
Figure 1b reports changes in TP bias as a function of changes in Inv_TR measured one quarter earlier. The plots are 
for the top and bottom Inv_TR portfolios. 
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Table 1. Variables definition 
 
Variable 
 
Definition 
1. Analyst TP, EPS and stock recommendation bias measures 
TP bias Bias in the analyst’s target price (TP), which is the difference between the target price and 
the stock price at the end of the 12-month forecast horizon, scaled by the stock price two 
days before the TP issue date (see equation (3)). 
TP bias 2 An alternative measure of TP bias, which is the difference between the target price and the 
stock price at the end of the 6-month forecast horizon, scaled by the stock price two days 
before the TP issue date. 
TP_not_met An indicator variable for whether the maximum stock price over the next six months is 
smaller than TP (see equation (4)). 
TP/P adj Market-adjusted analyst expected ex-dividend stock return, which is calculated as the ratio 
of the target price to the stock price measured two days before the TP issue date. The ratio 
is then adjusted for the return on the S&P500 index over the next 12-month period (see 
equation (5)).  
TP_relative The difference between the analyst’s TP and the median TP for a firm measured over 30 
days prior to the TP issue date. We scale the difference by the stock price two days before 
the TP issue date (see equation (6)). 
∆TP The percentage revision in the analyst target price for a firm calculated as the difference 
between two consecutive TPs issued by an analyst for a stock (see equation (7)).  
Optimistic stock 
recommendation 
An indicator variable taking the value of one when the analyst issues a stock 
recommendation above the consensus, and zero otherwise. The consensus recommendation 
is estimated over the previous 12 months. 
Avg TP bias_f Average TP bias of all TPs issued for a firm in a quarter. 
Avg TP bias_b Average TP bias of all TPs issued by a broker for a firm in a quarter. 
Past Avg TP bias Average TP bias of all TPs issued for a firm in the previous quarter. 
EPS bias EPS forecast bias measured as the signed difference between the forecasted, one-year-
ahead EPS and the actual EPS, scaled by the stock price measured two days before the TP 
issue date. We select only EPS forecasts issued jointly with the TP. 
2. Institutional ownership and holding period measures 
Inv_TR Following Gaspar et al. (2005, 2013), this is the weighted average churn ratio of 
institutional shareholders holding equity in a firm during the quarter. The investor turnover 
ratio is measured in the one quarter preceding the TP issue quarter. 
IO The level of institutional holdings in a stock measured in the one quarter preceding the TP 
issue quarter.  
#IO The number of institutional investors in a stock measured in the one quarter preceding the 
TP issue quarter. 
%HF ownership The level of hedge fund holdings in a stock measured in the one quarter preceding the TP 
issue quarter. 
#HF ownership The number of hedge funds holding a stock measured in the one quarter preceding the TP 
issue quarter. 
MFFlow The hypothetical annual change in mutual fund holdings implied by previously disclosed 
holdings and quarterly mutual fund outflows≥5% of total fund assets from Edmans et al. 
(2012). 
Avg IO other The average institutional ownership of all stocks (excluding firm k) covered by a broker 
calculated for the current quarter. 
Avg %HF ownership 
other 
The average hedge fund ownership of all stocks (excluding firm k) covered by a broker 
calculated for the current quarter. 
 
Continued on next page 
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Table 1 continued 
3. Analyst and broker characteristics 
Ana_experience  The number of years an analyst has issued at least one TP or EPS forecast. 
Ana_firm_followed The number of companies for which an analyst issued at least one TP or EPS forecast over 
the previous 12 months. 
Inv_bank  An indicator variable taking the value of one for analysts affiliated with an investment 
bank, and zero otherwise. To identify investment banks we use the Carter and Manaster 
(1990) list as updated by Loughran and Ritter (2004). 
Star An indicator variable for analysts selected to the All-America Research Team by the 
Institutional Investor magazine in the previous year. We use the Institutional Investor 
magazine ranking from the October issue of year t to identify forecasts issued by star 
analysts over the subsequent 12-months. 
4. Firm characteristics 
Short-interest Short-interest for a stock measured in the quarter prior to the TP issue date. 
B/M The book-to-market ratio, which is the book value of common equity scaled by the market 
capitalization measured at the previous fiscal year-end. 
Cov  Stock price standard deviation measured over 90-days before the previous fiscal year-end, 
scaled by the mean price level over this period.   
Div_dummy A dummy variable taking the value of one if the firm pays a dividend, and zero otherwise. 
Lehman An indicator variable equal to one in the two-year period after the Lehman Brothers 
collapse, and zero in the two-year period before September 2008. 
Firm_following  The number of analysts issuing at least one TP or EPS forecast for a firm over the previous 
12 months. 
Mom Buy-and-hold stock returns for 90-days prior to the previous fiscal year-end. 
MV  Firm market capitalization measured at the previous fiscal year-end. 
Industry effect Ten industry dummies based on Fama and French industry definitions.  
Year effect A set of annual dummies for the TP issue year. 
5. Price reaction analysis variables 
CAR (−1,1) The three-day cumulative abnormal return around the TP announcement. 
∆EPS The percentage revision in the analyst EPS forecast for a firm calculated as the difference 
between two consecutive EPS forecasts issued by an analyst for a stock and the same fiscal 
year. 
Upgrade An indicator variable for an upward revision in the analyst stock recommendation for a 
firm.  
Downgrade An indicator variable for a downward revision in the analyst stock recommendation for a 
firm. 
The table provides definitions of the dependent and independent variables used in the study. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  Mean Median STD Q1 Q3 
TP bias 0.084 0.075 0.669 −0.259 0.403 
TP bias 2 0.116 0.092 0.590 −0.181 0.358 
TP/P adj 0.127 0.082 0.528 −0.137 0.324 
TP relative 0.027 0.043 0.208 -0.091 0.130 
ΔTP 0.006 0.000 0.284 -0.101 0.101 
TP_not_met 0.422 0.000 0.494 0.000 1.000 
Inv_TR 0.213 0.207 0.047 0.183 0.236 
%HF ownership 0.072 0.060 0.055 0.032 0.099 
IO 0.642 0.686 0.230 0.492 0.825 
Inv_bank 0.528 1.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Ana_experience 6.781 6.000 3.512 4.000 9.000 
Ana_firm_followed 15.685 15.000 8.343 11.000 19.000 
Firm_following 11.563 9.000 8.592 5.000 16.000 
Cov 0.098 0.077 0.074 0.050 0.121 
B/M 0.584 0.447 0.544 0.261 0.724 
MV 3664.2 822.1 7362.6 280.7 2847.7 
Mom 0.065 0.045 0.302 −0.099 0.193 
Panel B: Mean TP bias for dual sorts on IO and Inv_TR 
 
High IO 2 3 Low IO 
High Inv_TR 0.102 0.146 0.181 0.264 
2 0.021 0.068 0.080 0.177 
3 −0.016 0.024 0.047 0.129 
Low Inv_TR 0.012 −0.004 0.046 0.096 
Panel C: Mean TP bias for dual sorts on IO and %HF ownership 
 
High IO 2 3 Low IO 
High %HF ownership 0.057 0.091 0.134 0.244 
2 0.013 0.056 0.080 0.190 
Low %HF ownership 0.001 −0.006 0.046 0.135 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
continued on next page  
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Table 2. continued 
Panel D: Pearson correlations 
 
TP bias Inv_TR IO Inv bank 
Ana_ 
experience 
Ana_firm_ 
followed 
COV 
Firm_ 
following 
B/M MV 
Inv_TR 0.126   
        
IO −0.089 0.037   
       
Inv bank −0.016 −0.048 0.025   
      
Ana_experience −0.039 0.013 0.124 −0.014   
     
Ana_firm_followed −0.014 −0.009 0.038 0.055 0.360   
    
COV 0.061 0.182 −0.132 −0.054 −0.099 −0.048   
   
Firm_following −0.027 −0.084 0.139 0.095 0.007 −0.020 −0.086 
   
B/M −0.058 −0.060 −0.070 −0.004 0.075 0.056 0.145 −0.142   
 
MV 0.035 −0.238 −0.043 0.121 0.056 −0.014 −0.230 0.590 −0.187   
Mom 0.047 0.131 −0.045 0.011 −0.108 −0.036 −0.013 −0.016 −0.229 −0.007 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics of the main variables used in this study. All variables are defined in Table 1. The sample includes 374,615 analyst 
forecasts for 72,629 firm-quarters. STD denotes the standard deviation. Q1 and Q3 denote the 25th and 75th percentiles. Panel B presents the average TP bias for 
portfolios double sorted by Inv_TR and IO. Panel C presents the average TP bias for portfolios double sorted by Inv_TR and %HF ownership. Panel D reports 
the Pearson correlations. 
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Table 3. Main regression results: the relation between TP bias and investor turnover and hedge fund ownership 
 
  Model 1 
  
Model 2 
  
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
  
Model 6 
   
TP bias TP bias TP/P adj TP/P adj ΔTP bias ΔTP bias 
  Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Panel A. Main TP optimism measures 
Intercept −0.069 0.320 0.274 0.000 0.302 0.000 0.418 0.000 −0.002 0.908 0.027 0.079 
Inv_TR 1.174 0.000 
  
0.420 0.001     
  
%HF ownership 
  
0.557 0.000   0.267 0.003 
    
ΔInv_TR         0.085 0.000   
Δ%HF ownership           0.004 0.010 
IO −0.203 0.000 −0.247 0.000 −0.252 0.000 −0.275 0.000 0.006 0.568 0.012 0.239 
Inv_bank −0.018 0.010 −0.018 0.010 −0.013 0.017 −0.013 0.016 −0.001 0.788 −0.001 0.722 
ln Ana_experience −0.013 0.118 −0.014 0.090 0.003 0.690 0.002 0.725 0.000 0.884 0.000 0.989 
ln Ana_firm_followed 0.010 0.222 0.009 0.244 0.003 0.682 0.003 0.692 −0.003 0.259 −0.002 0.379 
Cov 0.666 0.000 0.740 0.000 0.862 0.000 0.887 0.000 0.072 0.094 0.066 0.126 
ln Firm_following −0.063 0.000 −0.052 0.001 −0.034 0.009 −0.030 0.024 0.001 0.883 0.000 0.959 
ln B/M −0.018 0.077 −0.025 0.011 0.014 0.109 0.011 0.187 −0.002 0.513 −0.001 0.574 
ln MV 0.015 0.052 0.007 0.334 −0.013 0.042 −0.016 0.018 −0.003 0.077 −0.003 0.121 
Mom −0.016 0.459 −0.001 0.971 −0.068 0.000 −0.063 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.101 0.000 
Industry effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
N 374615 
 
374615 
 
374615  374615  200514 
 
200514 
 
F-test/Wald-Chi2 559.73 
 
554.39 
 
925.41  925.16  296.03 
 
286.88 
 
p-value 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000  0.000  0.000 
 
0.000 
 
R2 11.82%   11.60%   17.67%   17.65%   7.85%   7.62%   
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Table 3. continued 
  Model 1 
  
Model 2 
  
Model 3 
  
Model 4 
  
Model 5 
  
Model 6 
 
TP bias 2 TP relative TP_not_met ΔTP TP bias & Short-
interest 
EPS bias 
  Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Panel B. Additional TP optimism measures   
Intercept 0.198 0.001 -0.040 0.005 −0.307 0.077 0.029 0.011 0.026 0.706 0.036 0.000 
Inv_TR 0.646 0.000 0.048 0.039 0.851 0.024 0.230 0.000 1.184 0.000 −0.003 0.872 
Short interest         −0.790 0.000   
IO −0.211 0.000 0.006 0.219 −0.413 0.000 0.007 0.138 −0.128 0.002 −0.005 0.462 
Inv_bank −0.016 0.009 -0.014 0.000 −0.074 0.001 0.002 0.071 −0.017 0.011 0.001 0.387 
ln Ana_experience 0.003 0.686 0.014 0.000 0.066 0.008 0.006 0.000 −0.012 0.127 0.001 0.526 
ln Ana_firm_followed 0.003 0.692 -0.004 0.218 −0.021 0.364 -0.004 0.000 0.008 0.294 −0.002 0.294 
Cov 0.715 0.000 0.011 0.485 0.446 0.033 0.030 0.096 0.359 0.000 0.023 0.103 
ln Firm_following −0.054 0.000 0.003 0.155 −0.242 0.000 -0.004 0.038 −0.027 0.085 0.002 0.465 
ln B/M −0.005 0.581 0.000 0.763 0.005 0.831 0.006 0.000 −0.022 0.029 0.005 0.006 
ln MV 0.004 0.611 0.000 0.853 0.098 0.000 -0.001 0.420 −0.007 0.364 −0.003 0.013 
Mom −0.034 0.064 0.008 0.022 −0.118 0.005 0.078 0.000 0.045 0.049 −0.008 0.009 
Industry effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 374615 
 
283407 
 
 
374615 
 
297112  374615  132367  
F-test/Wald-Chi2 594.03  8.31 
 
 
8931 
 
708.17  461.43  13.64  
p-value 0.000  0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000  0.000  0.000  
R2 11.61%   0.22% 
 
  3.70%   8.76%  12.31%   1.59%  
The table presents regression results examining the relation between TP bias and investor turnover and hedge fund ownership. All variables are defined in Table 
1. We report the coefficient estimate (Coeff.) and the p-value (p-value) for each covariate. The reported p-values are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm and analyst level. ln indicates a natural logarithm.  
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 Table 4. Regressions dealing with endogeneity concerns 
  1st stage 2nd stage 2nd stage Analyst FE Firm FE LB collapse 
   Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 0.242 0.000 −0.439 0.005 −0.008 0.904 −0.211 0.000 −3.299 0.000 0.496 0.000 
Inv_TR 
  
2.866 0.000 
  
1.161 0.000 1.194 0.000 1.395 0.000 
%HF ownership 
    
5.338 0.000 
    
  
IO 0.022 0.000 −0.188 0.000 −0.705 0.000 −0.155 0.000 −0.092 0.034 −0.170 0.001 
Div_dummy −0.011 0.000 
        
  
MFFlow 0.001 0.000 
        
  
Inv_TR*Lehman           −0.923 0.009 
Lehman           −0.348 0.000 
Controls Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  
Industry effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes  
Year effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  
Firm FE No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No  
Analyst FE No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
No  
N 218077 
 
218077 
 
218077 
 
374615 
 
374615 
 
150670  
F-test/Wald Chi2 4733.46 
 
4863.11 
 
4696.61 
 
270.81 
 
264.97 
 
683.76  
p-value 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000  
R2 40.18%   10.86%   3.11%   8.51%   22.07%   20.90%  
The table reports regression results from the first and second stage of a 2SLS model that examines the relation between TP bias and investor turnover and hedge 
fund ownership. All variables are defined in Table 1. The dependent variable in the first stage regression is Inv_TR. The instruments in the 2SLS model are 
Div_dummy and MFFlow. It also reports results using the original specification but including analyst and firm fixed effects. The last column presents results 
from a quasi-natural experiment based on Lehman Brothers collapse. Lehman is an indicator variable equal to one in the two-year period after the Lehman 
Brothers collapse, and zero in the two-year period before September 2008. The reported p-values for 2SLS regressions are based on heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustered at the analyst level. p-values for regressions with analyst and firm fixed effects are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm and analyst level. ln indicates a natural logarithm. F-test is the model specification F-test for the first stage regression and fixed-effects 
regressions. Wald Chi2 is the model specification Chi2-test for the for second stage regression. 
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Table 5. Investor-level regressions 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept −0.347 0.000 −0.369 0.000 −0.369 0.000 −0.379 0.000 
Investor TR 0.010 0.041 0.013 0.001 0.012 0.001 0.013 0.000 
Investor TR > Inv_TR 
  
−0.002 0.278 −0.002 0.277 −0.002 0.251 
Loss on stock 
  
0.063 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.063 0.000 
Portfolio importance 
    
−0.035 0.430 
  
Portfolio importance*Investor TR 
    
0.198 0.063 
  
Ownership concentration in a stock 
      
0.200 0.008 
Ownership concentration in a stock*Investor TR 
      
0.571 0.038 
Inv_TR 1.353 0.000 1.330 0.000 1.330 0.000 1.329 0.000 
IO −0.198 0.000 −0.195 0.000 −0.195 0.000 −0.193 0.000 
Controls Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Industry effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
N 10024866 
 
10024866 
 
10024866 
 
10024866 
 
F-test   4961.79 
 
4673.14 
 
4419.51 
 
4427.28 
 
p-value 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
R2 13.75%   13.88%   13.88%   13.89%   
The table presents investor-firm-broker level regression results examining the relation between TP bias and investor turnover. Investor TR is the quarterly 
investor-level measure of stock turnover. Investor TR > Inv_TR is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the investor-level stock turnover is higher than the average 
turnover measured across all investors holding a stock, and 0 otherwise. Loss on stock is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the market-adjusted return on a stock 
over the quarter is negative, and 0 otherwise. Portfolio importance measures the importance of a stock in an investor’s portfolio and is calculated as the ratio of 
the investor’s ownership in a stock scaled by the sum of all investor holdings. Ownership concentration measures the magnitude of an investor’s blockholding in 
a stock and is measured as the ratio of the investor’s holding in a stock scaled by the total institutional ownership in that stock. Other variables are defined in 
Table 1. We report the coefficient estimate (Coeff.) and the p-value (p-value) for each covariate. The reported p-values are based on heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustered at the quarter and investor level.  
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Table 6. Price reaction regressions 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean STD p-value Q1 Q3 
Panel A1: positive TP revisions 
   
CAR (−1,1) 2.31% 6.44% 0.000 −1.15% 5.06% 
∆TP 15.27% 14.50% 0.000 5.71% 20.00% 
∆EPS 3.30% 19.75% 0.000 0.00% 2.69% 
Panel A2: negative TP revisions 
   
CAR (−1,1) −3.11% 8.90% 0.000 −7.10% 1.63% 
∆TP −16.35% 13.05% 0.000 −22.22% −6.58% 
∆EPS −8.35% 32.63% 0.000 −4.82% 0.00% 
Panel B: Price reaction regressions 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept −0.001 0.016 0.000 0.899 0.000 0.861 
∆TP 0.112 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.095 0.000 
∆TP*Inv_TR 
  
0.088 0.026 
  
∆TP*%HF ownership     
0.233 0.000 
∆EPS 0.033 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.033 0.000 
Downgrade −0.038 0.000 −0.038 0.000 −0.038 0.000 
Upgrade 0.021 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.021 0.000 
Inv_TR 
  
−0.004 0.532 
  
%HF ownership 
    
−0.013 0.021 
N 283763 
 
283763 
 
283763 
 
F-test 4810.84 
 
3249.25 
 
3220.22 
 
p-value 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
R2 13.41%   13.42%   13.51%   
Panel C: Long-run abnormal returns relative to the Carhart (1997) model 
 
  
Low TP/P adj High TP/P adj 
Diff (High−Low) 
TP/P adj 
p-value 
Low Inv_TR 0.028% 0.058% 0.030% 0.000 
High Inv_TR 0.090% 0.033% −0.057% 0.000 
Diff (High−Low) 
Inv_TR 
0.062% −0.025%   
p-value 0.000 0.002   
Panel D: Long-run abnormal returns relative to the Carhart (1997) model 
 
  
Low TP/P adj High TP/P adj 
Diff (High−Low) 
TP/P adj 
p-value 
Low %HF ownership 0.033% 0.041% 0.007% 0.147 
High %HF ownership 0.046% 0.005% −0.041% 0.004 
Diff (High−Low) 
Inv_TR 
0.013% −0.036%   
p-value 0.101 0.002   
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Table 6. continued 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics on the price reaction to analyst forecast revisions. Variables are defined in 
Table 1. STD denotes the standard deviation. Q1 and Q3 denote the 25th and 75th percentiles. Panel B presents 
regression results for the price reaction model. The reported p-values are based on heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm and analyst level. Panel C (Panel D) reports one-year average daily abnormal 
returns relative to the Carhart (1997) model for stocks sorted by investor turnover (hedge fund ownership) and TP 
bias measured by the market-adjusted TP/P. 
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Table 7. The relation between future institutional holdings and bias in analyst target prices 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  
 
Future IO Future IO 
Future  
holdings by short-
term investors 
Future  
holdings by long-
term investors 
Future #IO 
Future #HF 
ownership 
Future #HF 
ownership 
  
Coeff. p-value Coeff. 
p-
value 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 0.069 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.087 0.001 −0.438 0.000 −9.041 0.000 −4.984 0.000 
Avg TP bias_f −0.017 0.000 0.004 0.408 0.009 0.230 −0.022 0.051 −0.029 0.143 −0.225 0.075 −0.316 0.014 
Avg TP bias_f 
*Inv_TR   
−0.099 0.000 −0.120 0.000 0.047 0.438 −0.155 0.046 
    
Inv_TR 0.108 0.001 0.137 0.000 0.193 0.000 −0.103 0.345 0.268 0.021 
    
IO 0.823 0.000 0.822 0.000 0.827 0.000 0.823 0.000 −0.268 0.000 
  
−2.362 0.000 
#IO 
    
    
0.008 0.000 
  
0.018 0.000 
Avg TP bias_f *  
#HF ownership     
    
  
−0.035 0.005 −0.031 0.011 
#HF ownership     
    
  
0.710 0.000 0.617 0.000 
Controls Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Industry effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Year effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
N 67163 
 
67163 
 
33582 
 
33581 
 
67163 
 
67163 
 
67163 
 
F-test 1429.8 
 
1394.4 
 
1277.9 
 
846.0 
 
5743.4 
 
2294.7 
 
2580.0 
 
p-value 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
R2 75.91% 75.93% 76.19% 75.84% 92.81% 86.22% 86.54% 
This table presents firm-level regression results on the relation between TP bias and future institutional ownership. The dependent variable for Models 1 and 2 is 
the one-quarter ahead institutional ownership in a stock. For Model 3, it is the one-quarter ahead ownership by short-term investors, for Model 4, it is the one-
quarter ahead ownership by long-term investors, for Model 5, it is the one-quarter ahead number of institutional investors in a stock, and for Models 6 and 7, it is 
the one-quarter ahead number of hedge funds in a stock. The ‘Avg’ prefix indicates a firm-quarter average. Other variables are defined in Table 1. The reported 
p-values are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
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Table 8. Impact of TP bias on future institutional holdings of other stocks covered by a catering 
broker 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Future IO of 
other stocks 
Future IO of other 
stocks by short-
term investors 
Future IO of other 
stocks by long-
term investors 
Future %HF 
Ownership 
  Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept 0.159 0.000 0.211 0.000 0.176 0.000 0.056 0.000 
Avg TP bias_b −0.003 0.005 −0.007 0.002 −0.004 0.164 0.001 0.002 
Avg TP bias_b *Inv_TR 0.011 0.032 0.019 0.030 0.020 0.171 
 
 Inv_TR −0.023 0.000 −0.052 0.000 0.067 0.001 
  IO 0.000 0.428 −0.002 0.000 −0.002 0.000 
 
 Avg IO other 0.742 0.000 0.664 0.000 0.665 0.000 
  Avg TP bias_b *%HF ownership 
   
  
0.019 0.000 
%HF ownership 
    
  
−0.003 0.000 
Avg %HF ownership other 
    
  
0.060 0.032 
Industry effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
N 269374 
 
133737 
 
133375 
 
26937
4 
 F-test 645.02 
 
333.58 
 
439.21 
 
132.22 
 p-value 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
R2 73.65%   61.41%   68.22%   
30.89
%   
The table reports broker-level regression results that examine whether issuing optimistic target prices for stocks 
held predominantly by short-term investors increases these investors’ holdings of other stocks covered by the 
catering broker. The dependent variable in Model 1 is the average one-quarter ahead institutional ownership for all 
stocks (excluding firm k) covered by a broker. Models 2 and 3 show results for regressions where the dependent 
variable is the average future short-term (ST-IO) and long-term (LT-IO) institutional ownership, respectively. 
Model 4 reports results for Equation (12) where we use hedge fund holdings. Specifically, the dependent variable is 
the average one-quarter ahead hedge fund holdings of all stocks (excluding firm k) covered by broker b. Avg TP 
bias_b is the average bias of all TPs issued by a broker for firm k in a quarter. Avg IO other is the average 
institutional ownership for all stocks (excluding firm k) covered by the broker in a quarter. Investor turnover and 
institutional holdings are measured for stock k. %HF ownership is the hedge fund ownership for stock k in a 
quarter. %HF ownership other is the average hedge fund ownership for all stocks (excluding firm k) covered by the 
broker in a quarter. The reported p-values are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the 
broker level. All other variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
